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Abstract
Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for descriptive claims. I argue against one of the premises of Haack's argument. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense of this premise would cast doubt on a second premise of Haack's argument. My aim is to open up the possibility that value judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice
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DOI 10.1086/392932
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Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal.David Ludwig - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1253-1272.
Evidential Holism.Joe Morrison - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12417.

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