The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341 (2008)

Authors
Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
In this essay I present what is, I contend, the free-will problem properly thought through, or at least presented in a form in which it is possible to think about it without being constantly led astray by bad terminology and confused ideas. Bad terminology and confused ideas are not uncommon in current discussions of the problem. The worst such pieces of terminology are "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will." The essay consists partly of a defense of the thesis that the use of these phrases by writers on the problem of free will can only generate conceptual confusion and partly of a formulation of the problem that does not make use of them. I contend that this formulation is neutral with respect to the historically important positions on free will (e. g., compatibilism and incompatibilism)
Keywords Compatibilism  Compatibilist free will  Determinism  Free will  Incompatibilism  Libertarian free will  Libertarianism
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-008-9038-7
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References found in this work BETA

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David K. Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.

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Citations of this work BETA

Material Through and Through.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2431-2450.
Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What?Kristin Mickelson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929.

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