The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism

Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199 (1975)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call ' determinism ', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do. Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call ' determinism ', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called ' determinism ' without historical impropriety is incompatible with free will. I shall, however, assume without argument that what I call ' determinism ' is legitimately so called. In Part I, I shall explain what I mean by ' determinism '. In Part II, I shall make some remarks about 'can'. In Part III, I shall argue that free will and determinism are incompatible. In Part IV, I shall examine some possible objections to the argument of Part III. I shall not attempt to establish the truth or falsity of determinism, or the existence or nonexistence of free will

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,429

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.
Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism.André Gallois - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (July):99-105.
Lehrer on Determinism, Free Will, and Evidence.Peter Van Inwagen - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (5):351-357.
Divine Determinism, Human Freedom, and the Consequence Argument.Leigh C. Vicens - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155.
Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Common Sense, Strict Incompatibilism, and Free Will.Boris Rähme - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (1):107-124.
Determinism, Randomness, and Value.Noa Latham - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,451 (#3,953)

6 months
47 (#21,120)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Free Will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
Are Abilities Dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.
Against Counterfactual Miracles.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (2):241-286.

View all 116 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references