Inductivist Strategies for Scientific Realism

Valeriano Iranzo
Universitat de Valencia
Philip Kitcher has developed a sort of inductivist-reliabilist justification for scientific realism. After distinguishing his argument from a well-known abductivist one (the "no-miracles" argument), I will argue that Kitcher's proposal cannot adequately meet the antirealist challenge. Firstly, it begs the question against the antirealists; secondly, it can hardly support a plausible - piecemeal - scientific realism. I will explore an alternative inductivist approach that exploits correlations between theoretical properties and empirical success. On my view, its prospects for avoiding the aforementioned shortcomings are better than Kitcher's standpoint. I dare say, however, that an inductivist strategy alone cannot satisfy the demands of scientific realism since, in the end, an abductive move may well be mandatory for grounding it
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Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory.Timothy D. Lyons - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):891-901.

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