‘Our’ Practical Knowledge

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:21-26 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When I am asked “What are you doing?”, I answer e.g. “I am making coffee”. Anscombe called the knowledge that this kind of answer involves “practical knowledge”. Practical knowledge is knowledge not involving observation and inference. In this presentation I would like to apply this concept to the collectiveaction of many persons. Given that we are playing soccer if someone comes here and asks “What are you doing now?”, we can answer immediately “We are playing soccer”. I would like to claim that the above answer “We are playing soccer” is ‘our’ knowledge of ‘our’ intentional action and the subject of this intention is ‘we’ and there is a collective intention and the subject of knowledge of this intentional action is also ‘we’ and this is collective knowledge, i.e. common knowledge. We anticipate the following objection against this claim: Who utters “We are playing soccer” is an individual and who answers is not “we” but an individual person and she is describing “our” action. I reply to this objection. Furthermore I consider the background knowledge of ‘our’ practical knowledge and try to extend the concept of ‘practical knowledge’

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,199

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-04

Downloads
93 (#134,078)

6 months
1 (#448,894)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Yukio Irie
Osaka University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references