Philosophy of Science 54 (4):495-514 (1987)
Causal modeling methods such as path analysis, used in the social and natural sciences, are also highly relevant to philosophical problems of probabilistic causation and statistical explanation. We show how these methods can be effectively used (1) to improve and extend Salmon's S-R basis for statistical explanation, and (2) to repair Cartwright's resolution of Simpson's paradox, clarifying the relationship between statistical and causal claims
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Must Scientific Diagrams Be Eliminable? The Case of Path Analysis.James R. Griesemer - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (2):155-180.
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