Synchronizing Diachronic Uncertainty

Diachronic uncertainty, uncertainty about where an agent falls in time, poses interesting conceptual difficulties. Although the agent is uncertain about where she falls in time, this uncertainty can only obtain at a particular moment in time. We resolve this conceptual tension by providing a transformation from models with diachronic uncertainty relations into “equivalent” models with only synchronic uncertainty relations. The former are interpreted as capturing the causal structure of a situation, while the latter are interpreted as capturing its epistemic structure. The models are equivalent in the sense that agents pass through the same information sets in the same order, In this paper, we investigate how such a transformation may be used to define an appropriate notion of equivalence, which we call epistemic equivalence. Although our project is motivated by problems which have arisen in a variety of disciplines, especially philosophy and game theory, our formal development takes place within the general and flexible framework provided by epistemic temporal logic
Keywords Diachronic uncertainty  Epistemic temporal logic  The absent-minded driver  Absent-mindedness  Sleeping beauty
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10849-010-9122-9
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,810
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
43 ( #125,224 of 2,202,780 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #301,722 of 2,202,780 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature