Acta Analytica 26 (4):295-310 (2011)

Jenann Ismael
Columbia University
For most of the major philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, human cognition was understood as involving the mind’s reflexive grasp of its own contents. But other important figures have described the very idea of a reflexive thought as incoherent. Ryle notably likened the idea of a reflexive thought to an arm that grasps itself. Recent work in philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences has greatly clarified the special epistemic and semantic properties of reflexive thought. This article is an attempt to give an explicit characterization of the structure of reflexive thoughts that explains those properties and avoids the complaints of its critics
Keywords Reflexive thought  Model-theoretic argument  Semantic descent  Self-representation  Cognition  Reference-grounding  Lehrer
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0132-2
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Elements of Symbolic Logic.Hans Reichenbach - 1947 - London: Dover Publications.

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A Puzzle About Mental Self-Representation and Causation.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906.

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