Philosophy of Science 66 (3):351-69 (1999)

Authors
Jenann Ismael
Columbia University
Abstract
The Hard Problem of the mind is addressed and it is argued that physical-phenomenal property identities have the same status as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain. It is argued, that is to say, that such identities are, or follow from, stipulations which interpret the map
Keywords Experience  Perception  Phenomena  Science  Chalmers, D
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DOI 10.1086/392692
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The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
General Solution to All Philosophical Problems With Some Exceptions.Wayde Beasley - forthcoming - north of parallel 40: Numerous uncommitted.

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