Philosophy of Science 66 (3):351-69 (1999)
The Hard Problem of the mind is addressed and it is argued that physical-phenomenal property identities have the same status as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain. It is argued, that is to say, that such identities are, or follow from, stipulations which interpret the map
|Keywords||Experience Perception Phenomena Science Chalmers, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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