Two interpretations of ‘grue’– or how to misunderstand the new Riddle of induction

Analysis 64 (4):335–339 (2004)
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DOI 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00506.x
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References found in this work BETA
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
On the New Riddle of Induction.S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.
A Query on Confirmation.Nelson Goodman - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):383-385.
Grue.R. G. Swinburne - 1968 - Analysis 28 (4):123 - 128.

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Citations of this work BETA
Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem.Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.
On the Equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s Paradoxes.Kenneth Boyce - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):32-42.
Projectibility and Explainability or How to Draw a New Picture of Inductive Practices.Rami Israel - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):269 - 286.

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