Where monsters dwell

In Jerry Seligman & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation. Csli Publications, Stanford. pp. 1--303 (1996)

Authors
John Perry
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
Kaplan says that monsters violate Principle 2 of his theory. Principle 2 is that indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly referential. In providing this explanation of there being no monsters, Kaplan feels his theory has an advantage over double-indexing theories like Kamp’s or Segerberg’s (or Stalnaker’s), which either embrace monsters or avoid them only by ad hoc stipulation, in the sharp conceptual distinction it draws between circumstances of evaluation and contexts of utterance. We shall argue that Kaplan’s prohibition is also essentially stipulative, and that it is too general. The main difference between ourselves and Kaplan is that the basic carriers of a truth-value is a sentence-in-a-context; our account is utterance-based.
Keywords monsters  context-shifting  double-indexing  indexicals  utterance  Kaplan  Demonstratives  epistemic logic
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 48,824
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Formal Properties of 'Now'.Hans Kamp - 1971 - Theoria 37 (3):227-273.
Two-Dimensional Modal Logic.Krister Segerberg - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):77 - 96.
Pragmatics.Richard Montague - 1968 - In R. Klibansky (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy: A Survey, Volume 1. La Nuova Italia Editrice. pp. 102--22.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Plea for Monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
Semantic Monsters.Brian Rabern - forthcoming - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference.
Remembering, Imagining, and the First Person.James Higginbotham - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 496--533.
Context-Free Semantics.Paolo Santorio - 2019 - In Ernie LePore & David Sosa (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 208-239.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics.Lynsey Wolter - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):451-468.
Monsters in Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives.Brian Rabern - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.
Modal Monsters and Talk About Fiction.Stefano Predelli - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):277-297.
Context of Utterance and Intended Context.Claudia Bianchi - 2001 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2116:73-86.
The Impurity of “Pure” Indexicals.Allyson Mount - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):193 - 209.
Indexicals and Utterance Production.Dylan Dodd & Paula Sweeney - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):331-348.
Indexicals, Contexts and Unarticulated Constituents.John Perry - 1998 - In Atocha Aliseda-Llera, Rob J. Van Glabbeek & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Proceedings of the 1995 CSLI-Armsterdam Logic, Language and Computation Conference. CSLI Publications.
A Plea for Monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
138 ( #62,197 of 2,309,430 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #267,203 of 2,309,430 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature