Es la respuesta de Aristóteles al argumento de fatalismo en De Interpretatione 9 exitosa?” / “Is Aristotle’s Response to the Argument for Fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 Successful?

Ideas Y Valores 63 (154) (2014)
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My aim is to figure out whether Aristotle’s response to the argument for fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 is successful. By “response” here I mean not simply the reasons he offers to highlight why fatalism does not accord with how we conduct our lives, but also the solution he devises to block the argument he provides for it. Achieving my aim hence demands that I figure out what exactly is the argument for fatalism he voices, what exactly is his solution, whether his solution is coherent, and whether it does indeed succeed. I find that the argument is essentially bivalence plus that the truth of a proposition stating that an event will happen in the future entails that this event will necessarily happen, that Aristotle’s solution is to restrict bivalence when it comes to propositions about contingent future events, that this solution is coherent, and that while it does not rule out the possibility of fatalism, it does succeed in blocking the argument for fatalism offered within chapter 9.



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M. A. Istvan Jr.
Austin Community College

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