Intrinsic Value and the Argument from Regress

Abstract
Proponents of the argument from regress maintain that the existence of Instrumental Value is sufficient to establish the existence of Intrinsic Value. It is argued that the chain of instrumentally valuable things has to end somewhere. Namely with intrinsic value. In this paper, I shall argue something a little more modest than this. I do not want to argue that the regress argument proves that there is intrinsic value but rather that it proves that the idea of intrinsic value is a necessary part of our thinking about moral value.
Keywords Intrinsic Value  Argument from Regress
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DOI 10.5840/forphil20071227
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