Authors
Milena Ivanova
Cambridge University
Abstract
In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur, who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman?s relativised a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to show that the conjunction of Friedman?s relativised a priori with structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman?s view and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of McArthur?s argument. This compatibility is usually questioned, due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman?s view, which clashes with the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman?s view, but more importantly I question whether Friedman?s view really implies mind dependence
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DOI 10.1080/02698595.2011.552416
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
What is Structural Realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and the Constitutive A Priori.László E. Szabó - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (6):555-567.

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