Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief

Abstract
One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00493.x
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
Explaining Perceptual Entitlement.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.
Knowledge From Forgetting.Sven Bernecker & Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.

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