In D. Andler (ed.), Facets of Rationality. Sage Publications. pp. 19--34 (1993)
Jerry Fodor argued for an account of belief attribution very close to the theory of direct reference. I argue that his account conflicts with constraints on psychological explanation which he ought to accept.
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