Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters

Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496 (2019)

Authors
Elizabeth Jackson
Australian National University
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Permissivism  Uniqueness  Disagreement  Pragmatic Encroachment  Doxastic Voluntarism  Prudential Rationality
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1136-1
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References found in this work BETA

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.

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