Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters

Philosophical Studies:1-20 (forthcoming)
Authors
Elizabeth Jackson
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Permissivism  Uniqueness  Disagreement  Pragmatic Encroachment  Doxastic Voluntarism  Prudential Rationality
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1136-1
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.

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