Belief, Credence, and Evidence

Synthese:1-20 (forthcoming)
Authors
Elizabeth Jackson
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view focuses on the possibilities that the evidence makes salient. I argue that this makes better sense of the difference between rational credence and rational belief than other accounts.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Evidence  Rationality  Lottery Paradox  Statistical Evidence  Salience
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-01965-1
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Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.

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