Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408 (2021)

Elizabeth Jackson
Ryerson University
James Fritz
Virginia Commonwealth University
Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to epistemic rationality. To date, almost all proponents of radical moral encroachment hold to an asymmetry thesis: the moral encroaches on rational belief, but not on rational credence. In this paper, we argue against the asymmetry thesis; we show that, insofar as one accepts the most prominent arguments for radical moral encroachment on belief, one should likewise accept radical moral encroachment on credence. We outline and reject potential attempts to establish a basis for asymmetry between the attitude types. Then, we explore the merits and demerits of the two available responses to our symmetry claim: (i) embracing moral encroachment on credence and (ii) denying moral encroachment on belief.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Moral Encroachment  Epistemic Rationality
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Reprint years 2020, 2021
DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02799-6
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

There is No Such Thing as Doxastic Wrongdoing.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
#MeToo & the Role of Outright Belief.Alexandra Lloyd - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):181-197.
Uncoordinated Norms of Belief.Oliver Traldi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.

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