Consciousness, intentionality, and function: What is the right order of explanation?

I examine and criticize John Searle's view of the relationships between consciousness, intentionality and function.
Keywords Biology  Body  Consciousness  Mind  Science  Searle, J
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DOI 10.2307/2108319
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