Consciousness, intentionality, and function: What is the right order of explanation?

Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod
I examine and criticize John Searle's view of the relationships between consciousness, intentionality and function.
Keywords Biology  Body  Consciousness  Mind  Science  Searle, J
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2108319
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,629
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On a Searlean Objection to Rosenthal’s Theory of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):83-100.
Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
Searle on Consciousness and Dualism.Corbin Collins - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.
Why the Connection Argument Doesn’T Work.Robert Van Gulick - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-7.
Consciousness, Intentionality, and Pragmatism.Richard Rorty - 1993 - In Stig Møller Christensen & Derek D. Turner (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 388--404.


Added to PP index

Total views
130 ( #62,940 of 2,280,567 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #122,874 of 2,280,567 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature