Causal roles and higher-order properties [Book Review]

I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that fill some specified wide or distal roles
Keywords Causation  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Mind  Neurological  Properties
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DOI 10.2307/2653765
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Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.

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