Michael Jacovides
Purdue University
The paper contains four arguments to show that experiences don't represent. The first argument appeals to the fact that an experience can't occur without what the experience is of; the second appeals to the fact we can have an experience without having any awareness of what it is of, the third argument appeals to the fact that long experiences, such as the experience of being kidnapped, don't represent anything; and the fourth appeals to the fact that experiences often leave physical traces. The author rebuts several arguments for the conclusion that experiences represent. The author also considers some of the pitfalls involved in stipulating that experiences represent in a technical sense of “experience” or “represent”
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DOI 10.1080/00201740903478418
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Oxford University Press.

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Experiences as Complex Events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.

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