Elusive knowledge of things in themselves

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129 – 136 (2004)
Abstract
Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of things in themselves would remain elusive.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/713659791
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,975
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Three Arguments for Humility.David Yates - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
Quidditism Without Quiddities.Dustin Locke - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):345-363.
Against Digital Ontology.Luciano Floridi - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):151 - 178.
Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties.Alyssa Ney - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

396 ( #5,562 of 2,048,203 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #64,516 of 2,048,203 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums