In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 201-215 (2020)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
|
| Keywords | Epistemic paternalism Permissivism Uniqueness Epistemic justification Epistemic rationality Standpoint epistemology |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Knowing and Not‐Knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:433-447.
Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.
Epistemic Paternalism.Jalal Peykani & Faramarz Tagiul - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 7 (12):1-46.
How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):171-186.
Silencing, Epistemic Injustice, and Epistemic Paternalism.Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - forthcoming - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Rowman & LIttlefield.
Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.
Epistemic Paternalism and the Service Conception of Epistemic Authority.Michel Croce - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):305-327.
Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue From?Matthew Wilson - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):43-51.
Relativising Epistemic Advantage.Natalie Alana Ashton - forthcoming - In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism.
Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality.Jaemin Jung - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5093-5112.
Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness.Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):12-38.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2019-11-09
Total views
188 ( #49,621 of 2,403,693 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #14,920 of 2,403,693 )
2019-11-09
Total views
188 ( #49,621 of 2,403,693 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #14,920 of 2,403,693 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
