In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 201-215 (2020)

Authors
Elizabeth Jackson
Ryerson University
Abstract
Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
Keywords Epistemic paternalism  Permissivism  Uniqueness  Epistemic justification  Epistemic rationality  Standpoint epistemology
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.

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