In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 201-215 (2020)
AbstractEpistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
Similar books and articles
Knowing and Not‐knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:433-447.
Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.
Epistemic Paternalism.Jalal Peykani & Faramarz Tagiul - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 7 (12):1-46.
How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):171-186.
Silencing, Epistemic Injustice, and Epistemic Paternalism.Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Rowman & LIttlefield.
Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.
Epistemic Paternalism and the Service Conception of Epistemic Authority.Michel Croce - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):305-327.
Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?Matthew Wilson - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):43-51.
Relativising Epistemic Advantage.Natalie Alana Ashton - forthcoming - In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism.
Steadfastness, deference, and permissive rationality.Jaemin Jung - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5093-5112.
Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness.Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):12-38.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.