Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content?

Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176 (1990)
Abstract
First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that the truth-conditions of belief-ascriptions include aspects of the believer's environment does not entail that those environmental aspects are thereby parts of the contents of the person's thoughts.
Keywords Content  Externalism  Individualism  Intention  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1007/BF00367468
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Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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