International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41 (2003)
Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands semantic justification in foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments lead not to a type of skepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about semantic justification, and thus a holist about semantic facts
|Keywords||Coherentism Ethics Foundationalism Rule Scepticism Kripke, S|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Kripke's Account of the Rule-Following Considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
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