Metaphysica 12 (1):51-72 (2011)
Abstract |
This essay offers a detailed philosophical criticism of Frege’s popular thesis that identity is a relation of names. I consider Frege’s position as articulated both in ‘On Sense and Reference’, and in the Grundgesetze, where he appears to take an objectual view of identity, arguing that in both cases Frege is clearly committed to the proposition that identity is a relation holding between names, on the grounds that two different things can never be identical. A counterexample to Frege’s thesis is considered, and a positive thesis is developed according to which, in contradistinction to the Fregean position, identity is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation holding only between a thing and itself which can be expressed as a relation between names
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Keywords | Frege, Gottlob: identity Metaphysics Names, naming Semantic theory |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s12133-011-0077-3 |
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References found in this work BETA
Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
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Citations of this work BETA
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How Do We Know Things with Signs? A Model of Semiotic Intentionality.Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2017 - IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 10 (4):3683-3704.
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2011-05-13
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