How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
Authors
Elizabeth Jackson
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high stakes cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one’s belief that p. One should rather rely on one’s credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Belief-Credence Dualism  Pragmatic Encroachment  Reliance  Epistemic Rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Intrusión pragmática y valor epistémico.Pascal Engel - 2011 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1):25-51.
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-287.
Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-12-12

Total views
129 ( #50,711 of 2,313,603 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
129 ( #2,640 of 2,313,603 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature