Infinite Divisibility in Hume's First Enquiry

Hume Studies 20 (2):219-240 (1994)
Abstract
This paper examines Hume's arguments against the infinite divisibility of extension in the first _Enquiry<D>, notes to sections 124 and 125. Hume's reference to the problem of infinite divisibility as an illustration of skepticism about the limitations of reason are compared with his longer treatment of the topic in _Treatise<D> I.2. It is conjectured that Hume's reliance on Berkeley's refutation of abstract general ideas in the famous 'hint' of _Enquiry<D> 125 reflects his later acceptance of what he came to regard as the most compact and decisive refutation of the concept of infinite divisibility.
Keywords History of Philosophy  Major Philosophers
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ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI hume199420216
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