Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?

Mind and Society 2 (1):59-75 (2001)
Externalism is the view that the contents of many of a person’s propositional attitudes and perhaps sensory experiences are extrinsic properties of the person’s brain: they involve relations between the person’s brain and properties instantiated in his or her present or past environment. Privileged self-knowledge is the view that every human being is able to know directly or non-inferentially, in a way unavailable to anybody else, what he or she thinks or experiences. Now, if what I think (or experience) is not in my brain, then it seems indeed as if I cannot have any privileged authoritative first-personal access to the content of what I think. Hence, externalism seems inconsistent with privileged self-knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to provide a road towards a conciliation between self-knowledge and externalism
Keywords Brain  Externalism  Metaphysics  Self-knowledge
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Reprint years 2002
DOI 10.1007/BF02512075
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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