Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):71-85 (1987)
AbstractPhilosophy and theology have always been, in some measure, a matter of rewriting the past. This can be done with more or less objectivity, more or less insight, however. Of late, the job has not been done at all well with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard. His legacy is in danger of being coopted by modem nihilists. I argue in this paper that Kierkegaard’s understanding of truth, subjectivity, and paradox promises, in reality, a middle way between the metaextremes of foundational ism and nihilism. He is, in this sense, anti-modem
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References found in this work
Kierkegaard's "Fear and Trembling" in Logical Perspective.Edmund N. Santurri - 1977 - Journal of Religious Ethics 5 (2):225 - 247.
A Critique of Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Subjectivity.Roger S. Gottlieb - 1978 - Philosophical Forum 9 (4):475.
Citations of this work
Piety, MacIntyre, and Kierkegaardian Choice: A Reply to Professor Ballard.John Davenport - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):352-365.
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