Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):509-519 (2013)

Hilla Jacobson
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
According to strong representationalism it is in virtue of having a particular representational content that an experience has the specific phenomenal character that it has. This paper argues that representationalism does not have the resources to explain the most salient aspect of the phenomenal character of pain – it is bound to leave out the painfulness of pain or its negative affect. Its central argument proceeds by analysing the rationalising role of pains. According to it, representationalism is committed to a false picture on which a subject who knowingly acts so as to get rid of her pain without thereby getting rid of the bodily condition it represents always behaves irrationally – in so acting she is shooting the messenger. Thus, there can be no viable representationalist account of the phenomenal character of pain
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.12029
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Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain.Hilla Jacobson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):382-408.
Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):737-753.

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