David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Heythrop Journal 42 (4):463–479 (2001)
Celebrated as a theorist of science, and a source of stimulating ideas for theologians and philosophers of religion, Michael Polanyi explicitly denied cognitive relativism. Yet cognitive relativism, this paper suggests, is implied by Polanyi's account of conceptual frameworks and intellectual controversies.In ‘The Stability of Beliefs’ Polanyi understands conceptual frameworks as embedded in, and as expressed in the use of, their own languages. The language‐with‐theory limits the range of discussable subjects, interprets relevant facts in its own terms, permits only certain questions to be asked, with answers to these questions serving to confirm the framework.In Polanyi's masterwork, Personal Knowledge , these ideas inform his discussion of controversies over scientific frameworks and frameworks vying to become part of science. In each controversy, frameworks are logically disconnected, Polanyi foreshadowing the incommensurability thesisI argue that Polanyi's ideas satisfy recognised criteria of cognitive relativism. Perception is undetermined by objects and conditioned by language. Empirical propositions, in Polanyi's view, are accepted as true only within a conceptual framework. Polanyi regards supporters of logically disconnected frameworks as thinking differently, living in different worlds, speaking different languages and as experiencing communication failure. There is no framework‐independent argument or evidence to distinguish any framework as the best available approximation to the truth. Frameworks are logically disconnected and incommensurable
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Struan Jacobs (2006). Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn. Tradition and Discovery 33 (2):25-36.
Dale Cannon (2002). Construing Polanyi's Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation. Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.
David A. Stone (2013). The Experience of the Tacit in Multi- and Interdisciplinary Collaboration. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):289-308.
Tim Ray (2009). Rethinking Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge: From Personal Knowing to Imagined Institutions. [REVIEW] Minerva 47 (1):75-92.
Struan Jacobs (2009). Tradition in a Free Society. Tradition and Discovery 36 (2):8-25.
Charles Lowney (2011). Ineffable, Tacit, Explicable and Explicit. Tradition and Discovery 38 (1):18-37.
Gabriella Ujlaki (1994). The "Tacit" and the "Personal". Tradition and Discovery 21 (2):8-10.
Kyle Takaki (2009). Embodied Knowing. Tradition and Discovery 36 (2):26-39.
Stephen G. Henry (2011). A Clinical Perspective on Tacit Knowledge and Its Varieties. Tradition and Discovery 38 (1):13-17.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads7 ( #500,417 of 1,925,586 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #418,223 of 1,925,586 )
How can I increase my downloads?