Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):1-19 (1982)

Abstract
Meinong's theory of defective objects in On Emotional Presentation is ambiguous in ways which give rise to a dilemma. It is not clear whether or not defective objects are supposed to be a special kind of intentional object. If they are intentional objects, then a strengthened version of Mally's paradox about self-referential thought can be given which contradicts the intentionality thesis. But if they are not intentional objects, then thoughts with defective objects themselves constitute immediate counter-examples to the intentionality thesis. In either case, the theory of defective objects cannot be made logically consistent with both the possibility of self-referential thought and the intentionality thesis in its full generality
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI 10.5840/gps19821515
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Object Theory Logic and Mathematics: Two Essays by Ernst Mally.Dale Jacquette - 2008 - History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (2):167-182.
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