Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited

Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of content, but for anyone who takes seriously the representational nature of intentional states, it must be one legitimate and central notion of content. To discover that DNA has a double helix structure is to make a selection from the various possible structures
Keywords Metaphysics  Possible World  Representation  Twin Earth
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DOI 10.2307/3219741
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Color Primitivism.David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1/2):73 - 105.
Color Primitivism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2006 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Erkenntnis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73 - 105.

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