On assertion and indicative conditionals

Philosophical Review 88 (4):565-589 (1979)
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Abstract

I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature

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Frank Jackson
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Contextualism: An explanation and defense.Keith DeRose - 1998 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 187--205.

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