On Doing Things Intentionally

Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409 (2012)

Authors
Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications of our account for folk psychology
Keywords Experimental Philosophy  Action Theory  Intentional Action  Moral Psychology  Semantics
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01449.x
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References found in this work BETA

Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

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