Phenomenal consciousness, representational content and cognitive access: a missing link between two debates

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1021-1035 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Two debates loom large in current discussions on phenomenal consciousness. One debate concerns the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. Representationalism affirms, whereas “content separatism” denies, that phenomenal character is exhausted by representational content. Another debate concerns the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. “Access separatism” affirms, whereas, e.g., the global workspace model denies, that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not cognitively accessed. I will argue that the two separatist views are related. Access separatism supports content separatism by undermining the most prominent sort of arguments in favor of representationalism, namely ones that appeal to the phenomenology of perceptual experiences



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
Consciousness and cognitive access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination.René Jagnow - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.
Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.


Added to PP

95 (#182,381)

6 months
12 (#220,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?