Authors
Debra L. Jackson
California State University, Bakersfield
Abstract
Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I argue that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in the context of a polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who are able to make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their knowledge to others.
Keywords epistemic injustice  recognition theory  #metoo  sexual harassment  sexual assault
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DOI 10.5206/fpq/2018.4.6231
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Citations of this work BETA

#MeToo, Social Norms, and Sanctions.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen & Nicolas Olsson Yaouzis - 2020 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (3):273-295.
The Agent in Pain: Alienation and Discursive Abuse.Paul Giladi - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):692-712.

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