Reason-Giving and the Natural Normativity of Argumentation

Topoi 38 (4):631-643 (2019)
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Argument is a pervasive feature of human interaction, and in its natural contexts of occurrence, it is organized around the management of disagreement. Since disagreement can occur around any kind of speech act whatsoever, not all arguments involve a claim supported by reasons; many involve standpoints attributed to someone but claimed by no one. And although truth and validity are often at issue in naturally occurring arguments, these do not exhaust the standards to which arguers are held. Arguers hold one another accountable for cooperating in the management of disagreement, infusing argumentation with a natural normativity that exists apart from any theorized appraisal standard applied to the claim-reason relationship. Argumentation’s natural normativity is visible not only in how arguments unfold in interaction but also in how humanity continuously strives to improve its methods of disagreement management.



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Sarah Jackson
University of Manchester

References found in this work

The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Cambridge University Press.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Philosophy 34 (130):244-245.
The Uses of Argument.Frederick L. Will & Stephen Toulmin - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (3):399.

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