Philosophia 37 (3):437-439 (2009)

Michael Jacovides
Purdue University
The author defends attributing to Berkeley the thesis that we can't conceive of extension in a mind-independent body against criticism from Smalligan Marusic. The author also specifies the resemblance requirements that Berkeley places on conceivability, concedes that the principle that ideas can only be like other ideas is not, strictly speaking, a premise in the Master Argument, and clarifies his views on the relation between possibility and conceivability.
Keywords Berkeley  Smalligan Marusic  Master Argument  Conceivability  Resemblance
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9179-3
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