Stich againstde dicto‐de reambiguity

Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):223-230 (1989)
Abstract
Abstract Stephen P. Stich rejects the de dicto?de re belief state and ascription distinction. He proposes an analysis by which belief sentences imply univocal doxastic predicates expressing functionally similar states of belief subjects and counterfactual third person belief ascribers, concluding that the apparent opacity of de dicto belief sentences is better explained by the unsystematic contextually?sensitive similarity vaguenesses of belief ascriptions. But Stick's reduction appeals to contexts of background beliefs which themselves unavoidably exhibit ramified de dicto?de re ambiguity. The distinction is presupposed rather than eliminated by Stick's method, which effectively blocks the extensional reduction of belief state opacity
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DOI 10.1080/09515088908572973
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.W. V. Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
De Re Senses.John McDowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pollock on Token Physicalism, Agent Materialism and Strong Artificial Intelligence.Dale Jacquette - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):127 – 140.

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