State consciousness revisited

Acta Analytica 11 (16):29-54 (1996)
I try to reconcile Dretske's representational theory of conscious mental states with Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of conscious mental states by arguing that Rosenthal's HOT can make room for the notion of a state of consciousness whereby an invidual may be conscious of an object or property without thereby being conscious of being in such a state.
Keywords Consciousness  Epistemology  Intentionality  Representation  Dretske, F
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