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State consciousness revisited
Abstract
I try to reconcile Dretske's representational theory of conscious mental states with Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of conscious mental states by arguing that Rosenthal's HOT can make room for the notion of a state of consciousness whereby an invidual may be conscious of an object or property without thereby being conscious of being in such a state.Author's Profile
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Similar books and articles
Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
On a Searlean Objection to Rosenthal’s Theory of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):83-100.
Appendage theory -- pro and con.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (4):371-96.
Advancing the debate between HOT and FO accounts of consciousness.Robert W. Lurz - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:23-44.
Precis of The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, & Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco Gennaro - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):6-30.
Self-consciousness and Intentionality. A Reappraisal of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s Theses.Pedro M. S. Alves - 2015 - Discipline filosofiche. 25 (2):149-165.
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
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Author's Profile
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