Two mistakes about credence and chance

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111 (2004)
Abstract
David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle--the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability--in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position that, unlike reductionism, it can give no coherent explanation for why the Principal Principle should hold. I argue that both of these claims are fundamentally mistaken.
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DOI 10.1080/713659806
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Chance, Determinism, and Unsettledness.Antony Eagle - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
Probability in GRW Theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.

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