Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111 (2004)
David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle--the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability--in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position that, unlike reductionism, it can give no coherent explanation for why the Principal Principle should hold. I argue that both of these claims are fundamentally mistaken.
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