Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111 (2004)

Authors
Ned Hall
Harvard University
Abstract
David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle--the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability--in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position that, unlike reductionism, it can give no coherent explanation for why the Principal Principle should hold. I argue that both of these claims are fundamentally mistaken.
Keywords Probability   Lewis   Laws   Philosophy of Science   Principal Principle
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DOI 10.1080/713659806
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.

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Citations of this work BETA

Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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