Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13 (2020)

Authors
Elizabeth Jackson
Ryerson University
Abstract
Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one’s subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Degree of Belief  Reduction  Lockean Thesis  Epistemic Rationality  Lottery Paradox  Preface Paradox  Statistical Evidence
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12668
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

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