Truth vs. pretense in discourse about motion (or, why the sun really does rise)

Noûs 41 (2):298–317 (2007)
These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full and complete stop at the stop sign, we fret that traffic is moving too slowly, we observe that the sun has dropped below the hills on the horizon, all without ever saying which frames of reference we have in mind.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00648.x
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Jason Stanley (2000). Context and Logical Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.

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