Understanding and Semantic Structure: Reply to Timothy Williamson

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his essay ‘“Conceptual Truth”’, Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson’s argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider the role that the structure of a sentence plays in determining its meaning. The cases I present suggest that this role imposes greater cognitive requirements on understanding than Williamson can acknowledge.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent.David Efird - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Conceptual truth.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):1–41.
Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157.Murali Ramachandran - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
Understanding as endorsing an inference.Andrew Jorgensen - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):35-54.
The instability of vague terms.Anna Mahtani - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):570–576.
Semantic plasticity and epistemicism.Adam Sennet - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):273-285.
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic.Thomas Hofweber - 209 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):93–115.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-02-11

Downloads
468 (#36,539)

6 months
4 (#315,908)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Brendan Balcerak Jackson
Bielefeld University

References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.
Truth and meaning: essays in semantics.Gareth Evans & John Henry McDowell (eds.) - 1976 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press.
Conceptual truth.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):1–41.
Semantic structure and logical form.Gareth Evans - 1976 - In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--75.

Add more references