Mind and Language 35 (2):141-155 (2020)

Authors
Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Frank Jackson
Australian National University
Abstract
David Lewis argues that believing something is self‐ascribing a property rather than holding true a proposition. But what is self‐ascription? Is it some new mysterious primitive? Is Lewis saying that every belief you have is about you? Several recent authors have suggested that, in the light of these questions, Lewis's theory should be rejected, despite its enormous influence. But this neglects the fact that Lewis makes two relevant proposals about belief: one about belief de se , another about belief de re . It is the second that prompts these questions but the first that is central to his theory.
Keywords Lewis  belief  belief de re  belief de se  functionalism  self‐ascription
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12237
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References found in this work BETA

Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
The Myth of the De Se.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.
The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.

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