In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 175--197 (1997)
Dretske has argued that, unlike the content of beliefs and desires, the contents of innate representations cannot in principle play a role in the causal explanation of an individual's behavior. I examine this "asymmetry" and against it, I argue that the content of innate mental representations too can play a causal role in the explanation of behavior.
|Keywords||Innateness Representation Semantics|
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